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Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
More than two-thirds of married women under age 65 are now working outside 
the home. The tax treatment of married women is therefore a subject of sub- 
stantial importance not only to the women themselves but also to anyone con- 
cerned about the operation of our labor markets and the efficiency of our tax 
system. 
The U.S. system of taxing the earnings of married women is very different 
from the methods used  in most  other major  industrial  nations. Among the 
OECD countries, the most common procedure is to tax each married taxpayer 
separately, thereby  giving married  women the same tax  schedule that they 
would face if  they were single.’ In contrast, the personal income tax in the 
United States taxes married couples on their combined income, thus not distin- 
guishing between an increase in family income due to higher earnings of the 
husband and an increase in family income due to the wife’s earnings. As a 
practical matter, the wife’s marginal personal income tax rate on her first dollar 
of earnings is frequently the marginal income tax rate on her husband’s last 
dollar of earnings. 
More important, however, the overall marginal tax rate of the married work- 
ing woman is substantially higher than her husband’s marginal tax rate because 
of the rules governing social security taxes and retirement benefits. Married 
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I. See Munnell(l980) for a summary of the tax treatment of married couples in other countries. 
These rules have been revised in several countries in recent years. Britain and Canada have recently 
adopted new rules in which married women are taxed separately. 
39 40  Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
women and married men are both subject to the same 15.3 percent payroll tax 
on earnings (including the portion paid  by  employers). Because  the level of 
future retirement and survivor benefits depends on the level of earnings during 
working years, the effective social security tax rate is the difference between 
the statutory 15.3 percent and the present actuarial value of the future benefits 
that the employee can expect per additional dollar of his or her earnings. The 
rules governing retirement and survivor benefits mean that the expected pres- 
ent value of these benefits is generally substantially higher per marginal dollar 
of  a  husband’s  earnings than  for  a  marginal  dollar of  a  wife’s  earnings. 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) show that, for a typical middle-income married 
couple in their forties, the net social security OASI payroll  tax rate in  1990 
(excluding the disability and hospital insurance portions)  was the full statu- 
tory  rate  of  11.2 percent  for the  wife  but  only  about  3.8 percent for the 
husband.? 
The current U.S. system of taxing married women has been criticized for 
three weaknesses. First, the high marginal tax rates on married women inap- 
propriately  distort their decisions about whether  to work  and, if  they  work, 
about how much to work. The basic theory of optimal taxation implies that the 
total deadweight  loss of the tax  system is reduced if  marginal tax rates are 
lower on those individuals whose labor supply is more sensitive to marginal 
tax rates. Since there is substantial evidence that the labor supply elasticities 
of married women are substantially greater than the labor supply elasticities of 
their husbands,’ the theory of  optimal taxation implies that  married  women 
should be taxed at a lower marginal tax rate than their husbands.4 In contrast 
to this optimality condition, the social security tax and benefit rules make the 
marginal tax rates on married women’s earnings substantially higher than on 
2. The difference reflects the fact that husbands generally have higher average lifetime earnings 
than their wives and that retiree wives are entitled to the greater of their own benefit and 50 percent 
of their husband’s benefit. Since wives generally outlive their husbands, it is also important that a 
surviving wife is entitled to the higher of the benefits based on her own lifetime earnings and her 
husband’s full benefit. Feldstein and Samwick (1992) present calculations of the net present value 
of retirement benefits for a variety of different combinations of income, demographic status, and 
discount rates. 
3. See, e.g., the survey by Triest (1990) and the more recent study by Eissa (1995). 
4. This conclusion is emphasized by  Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). The relevant labor supply 
elasticities are the compensated elasticities of  labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax share, 
i.e., to one minus the marginal tax rate. The proposition that applying a lower marginal tax rate to 
married women than to their husbands reduces the overall deadweight loss of  the tax system de- 
pends on the cross-elasticities of labor supply as well as on the own elasticities; to the extent that 
there is evidence on this cross-elasticity (see, eg,  Triest 1990; Hausman and Ruud  1984) it ap- 
pears to be sufficiently small so that it does not change the hasic result. 
A more general analysis of the deadweight loss of  the income tax recognizes that it depends on 
distortions to the pattern of consumption (in favor of deductible items like mortgage interest and 
excludable items like fringe benefits) and to the nature of labor supply (effort, location, risk taking, 
etc., in addition to participation and hours). Feldstein (1995~)  shows that this more comprehensive 
measure of deadweight loss can be evaluated in  terms of  the elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the net-of-tax share. We  plan to use the broader measure to evaluate alternative tax 
treatments of two-earner families in a future study. 41  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
their husbands’  earning^.^ The calculations developed in this paper show that 
the overall deadweight loss of the tax system could probably be reduced by 
lowering the marginal tax rate of married women even though there is a dead- 
weight loss associated with the taxes needed to replace the lost revenue. 
A second common criticism of the current system is that it imposes a “mar- 
riage penalty” on some mamed couples by taxing them more than the same 
two individuals would pay on the same income if they were single.6 The mar- 
riage penalty is seen as unfair because it violates the basic principle of taxing 
equals equally by imposing different tax burdens on two otherwise identical 
couples. Although it could be argued that the two couples are not identical 
because one couple has chosen to live together without marrying while the 
other couple has called upon the state to provide the legal benefits of marriage, 
it seems contrary to general public policy to impose a fiscal charge on individu- 
als for choosing to marry rather than living together without marrying. More- 
over, as living together without marriage becomes more common, the effect of 
the marriage tax on the decision to marry is also likely to become more sub- 
stantial.’ 
Finally, the current system is considered unfair because it imposes the same 
tax burden on a married couple with one earner as it does on a two-earner 
couple with  the  same income.8 The two-earner couple will  in general have 
more total hours of work and less of the untaxed home services of the second 
earner. 
The present paper examines the efficiency  and revenue effects of  several 
alternative tax treatments of two-earner families. These options also have the 
effect of reducing the marriage penalty and of reducing the tax on two-earner 
couples relative to the tax on single-earner couples with the same total income. 
In addition to these new options, the present paper is distinguished from previ- 
ous contributions to the analysis of two-earner families by four technical im- 
provements: 
1. The analysis uses new,  and we believe  more reliable,  estimates of the 
compensated elasticities of the labor supply of  married women based on the 
experience with the 1986 tax rate  reduction^.^ 
5. Previous discussions have ignored the important effect of net social security taxes; see, e.g., 
6.  See the discussions in Feenberg and Rosen (1983, 1994), Munnell(1980), and Rosen (1987). 
7. Although there appears to be no direct research on this point, it is noteworthy that in 1992 
there were 3.3 million unmarried couples (defined as two unrelated adults of  the opposite sex 
sharing the same household) and that 1  .I million of these couples had at least one child under the 
age of  15. This compares to approximately 56 million married couples. Among 25-44-year-olds, 
there were 2.0 million unmarried couples and 26 million married couples, a ratio of 7.6 percent. 
8. In fact, because of the social security tax and benefit rules, a couple with two earners is likely 
to pay more net tax than a couple with one earner and the same total income. The two-earner 
couple will pay more in tax (net of the present value of future social security benefits) unless the 
husband and wife have the same earnings in every year. 
9. These elasticities have been estimated by Eissa (1995). We  believe that her difference-in- 
difference estimates are more reliable than previous estimates based on cross-sectional variation 
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2. The marginal tax rates explicitly incorporate the social security payroll 
taxes net of the present actuarial value of future retirement benefits. 
3. The analysis of alternative options is based on the NBER TAXSIM model 
which has been modified for this study to incorporate separate estimates of the 
earnings of husbands and wives. 
4.  Explicit estimates of the effects of  the alternative  options on the dead- 
weight  loss  of  the  tax  system  are  presented.  These reflect  separately  the 
changes in labor force participation and in average hours among those who are 
working. The analysis is based on the Harberger-Browning local approxima- 
tion and therefore does not require any assumption about the form of the util- 
ity function. 
Section 2.1 of the paper presents a simple heuristic calculation that indicates 
that reducing the marginal income tax rate on a representative married women 
to what it would be if she were single would substantially reduce the dead- 
weight loss of the tax system as a whole. Section 2.2 extends this simple analy- 
sis to reflect changes in labor force participation as well as in average hours 
among those who are employed. This disaggregated analysis confirms the gen- 
eral estimates of the simpler model of the previous section. 
Section 2.3 then describes the augmented TAXSIM model that is used to 
evaluate a variety of  alternative  options for the entire population of  mamed 
taxpayers. The options are specified and the simulation results are presented in 
section 2.4. There is a brief concluding section. 
2.1  Effect of Reducing the Marginal Tax Rate on Married Women: 
A Simplified Calculation 
In 1994, a married woman in a couple with taxable income between $38,000 
and $91,850 had a marginal federal personal income tax rate of 28 percent. In 
addition, she and her employer paid a social security payroll tax (including the 
Medicare portion) of  15.3 percent for which she can generally expect to re- 
ceive little or no incremental benefit (Feldstein and Samwick 1992). She was 
also likely to face a state marginal income tax rate of 5 percent or higher. Her 
combined  marginal tax rate was therefore approximately  48 percent  of  her 
taxable income.'O 
in after-tax wage rates. Since previous estimates of labor supply behavior have been shown to be 
sensitive to the choice of  functional form, it is significant that the difference-in-difference ap- 
proach avoids the need to specify an explicit functional form. A further advantage of this approach 
is that it is not necessary to impute a wage rate to the women who are out of  the labor force. 
Eissa's overall estimated supply elasticity, including the effects of  both participation and hours, 
is not substantially different from the central tendency of the general body of previous work. See, 
e.g.,  the recent survey by  Triest (1990). The confirmation of these earlier cross-sectional results 
by the more reliable difference-in-difference estimates is nevertheless very reassuring. 
10. Because the employer's half of the 15.3 percent payroll tax is not included in the individual's 
taxable income, the combined tax of 48 percent is equivalent to 48/(  1.0765) = 45 percent of  the 
full pretax wage. The deadweight loss depends therefore on this marginal tax rate although applied 43  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
Most married women would have faced a marginal federal personal income 
tax rate of only 15 percent if they were taxed as single individuals on their own 
income."  If they were taxed in this way, their total marginal tax rate would be 
reduced from 48 percent to 35 percent. 
This section presents a simplified but very detailed estimate of the effect of 
reducing the tax rate on married women from 48 percent to 35 percent. The 
analysis suggests that this rate reduction would reduce the deadweight loss by 
substantially more than the decline in revenue. More specifically, the parameter 
values based on the estimated behavior of  labor supply imply that, for such 
women, the deadweight burden of  the tax would  decline by $2.74 for each 
dollar of revenue loss. Since there are other ways of  raising revenue with a 
substantially smaller relative deadweight loss, reducing the marginal tax rate 
on married women could be part of a broader tax reform that reduces the over- 
all deadweight loss of the tax system. 
Reducing the marginal income tax rate on married women would also ad- 
dress (but not completely remedy) the other two criticisms of the existing tax 
rules. It would reduce the marriage penalty and would tax a two-earner couple 
less than a single-earner couple with the same income. 
Our analysis focuses on the effect of taxes on labor force participation and 
average hours. A more comprehensive analysis would recognize that changing 
tax rates affects taxable income through a number of other channels, including 
the  intensity  of  work  effort,  the  form  of  compensation,  the  use  of  tax- 
deductible  expenditures,  and  various  aspects  of  nonlabor  income  and  ex- 
penses.'* By focusing just on the traditional labor supply measures of partici- 
pation and hours we understate the deadweight loss of the current situation and 
the potential gain from reform. We return  to this subject in the concluding 
section. 
The current analysis uses the labor supply elasticities recently estimated in 
Eissa's  (1995) study of the response of  married women to the  1986 tax rate 
reductions. In contrast to previous cross-sectional studies, Eissa used the natu- 
ral experiment of  the  1986 rate reductions to study how married women re- 
sponded to differences in the marginal rate reductions associated with differ- 
ences in their husbands' pre- 1986 income levels. This difference-in-difference 
approach, based on successive Current Population Surveys, found a compen- 
sated elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the net of tax wage (i.e., 
to a tax base that is larger by a factor of 1.0765. Since the net effect is to reduce the deadweight loss 
by less than one-tenth, we postpone taking this into account until we get to the detailed TAXSIM 
calculations in section 2.4. This makes the illustrative calculations in the first two sections easier 
to follow. 
11. Under the tax schedule for single individuals, the taxpayer would pay a 15 percent marginal 
tax on taxable income up to $22,750. Since the median money income of year-round full-time 
female workers was only $22,167 in 1992, a substantial majority of working wives in 1994 would 
have earnings below $22,750. 
12. See Feldstein (1995a. 1995c, 1996) for a more complete discussion of the importance of 
this broader definition of taxpayers' responses to higher marginal tax rates. 44  Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
to (1 -  t)w, where t is the  marginal tax rate  and  w is the pretax  wage)  of 
0.42 and a compensated elasticity of the hours worked among those who are 
employed of 0.45.13  Although the next section will study the separate responses 
of participation  and hours, the  simpler model in  the current  section uses a 
single overall elasticity of total hours with respect to the net of tax share. 
The effect of the tax rate reduction on revenue depends on the corresponding 
uncompensated elasticity of  total hours with respect to the net-of-tax share. 
The usual Slutsky decomposition implies 
(1)  dLl(1 -  t)  = {dL/d(l -  t)},,,,  + (dL/dy)[dy/d(l  -  t)], 
where L is hours worked, t is the marginal tax rate, and dy is the rise in income 
that results from the tax rate reduction with no behavioral  response. Multi- 
plying both sides by ( 1 -  t)/L  gives the corresponding elasticity expressions: 
(2)  [(I -  t)/L][dL/d  (1 -  f)] = [(l -  t)/L]  {dL/d(l -  t)},,,, 
+ [(l -  t)/L]  (dL/dy)[dy/d(l -  t)]. 
Writing  -q  for the uncompensated  supply elasticity on the left-hand side of 
equation (2)  and E for the compensated supply elasticity (the first term on the 
right-hand side) and noting that dyld (1 -  t)  = -dy/dt  = wL, where w is the 
pretax wage, allows us to rewrite equation (2)  as 
(3)  q = E + (1 -  t)wdL/dy. 
Eissa's estimates of compensated elasticities of participation and hours of 0.45 
and 0.42 imply a total compensated labor supply elasticity of about E  = 0.9. 
Previous estimates imply that the income effect, that is, the net-of-tax expendi- 
ture on leisure per dollar of additional exogenous income, -( 1 -  t)w(dl/dy), 
is approximately 0.10, implying that q = E -  0.10 = 0.80. 
With this information in  mind, recall the  traditional Harberger-Browning 
f~rmula'~  for the deadweight loss of the income tax with a marginal tax rate of 
t is 
(4)  DWL = 0.5rt2wL/(1 -  t). 
Thus, with a marginal tax rate of 0.48, the deadweight loss is 
13. These estimates use the difference-in-difference framework combined with regression equa- 
tions to control for demographic differences to reduce the bias and the variance of  the parameter 
estimates. The raw difference-in-difference estimates are 0.35 for participation and 0.38 for hours, 
so the effect of the regression adjustment is a small increase in the estimated elasticities. Elasticit- 
ies are calculated at the mean participation rate (0.464) and mean hours of those who  worked 
(1,283 hours per year) among the women with high-income husbands. 
14.  Browning (1987)  showed that the original Harberger (1964) formula for the deadweight loss 
(DWL = O.5r2&wL)  has to be modified when the elasticity and the labor supply are not measured at 
the undistorted no-tax point. Since the elasticity estimate that we use and the initial labor supply 
are both measured at the with-tax distorted point, the traditional Harberger formula must be modi- 
fied by dividing by  1 -  r. See Browning (1987, 13) and the derivation of eq. (7) below. 45  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
DWL = 0.5 (0.48)2~~L  (1 -  0.48)-’. 
The corresponding formula for the reduction in the deadweight loss if the mar- 
ginal tax rate is reduced from 48 to 35 percent is 
(5)  ADWL = -0.5[(0.48)’ -  (0.35)2]~~W(1  -  0.48) 
= -0.093wL. 
If  the woman pays the same tax rate on all of her income,15  a change in the 
marginal tax rate alters her tax liability at the rate of 
(6)  d(nYL)/dt = [ 1 -  (t/(  1 -  t))  q]wL. 
A tax reduction of dt = 0.13 from t = 0.48 implies a revenue loss of 0.034wL. 
Thus, every dollar of  revenue loss reduces the deadweight loss by  0.093/ 
0.034 = $2.74. Stated differently, this calculation implies that the total cost 
(including both the resource transfer and the deadweight loss) of taxing mar- 
ried women at 48 rather than 35 percent is $3.74 for each extra dollar of reve- 
nue collected because the higher rate is used. Reducing the marginal tax rate 
from 48 percent to 35 percent would reduce the total deadweight loss of the 
tax system as a whole if the decline in revenue can be offset from some other 
source with a deadweight loss of less than $2.74 per dollar of revenue. 
The estimated loss of revenue caused by the reduction of the tax rate is based 
on the assumption that the woman’s  entire income was initially taxed at 48 
percent. Recall that a 48 percent marginal tax rate for married women is based 
on a 28 percent federal marginal income tax rate and that the 28 percent rate 
begins at $38,000 of taxable income for a married couple. With one child and 
the standard deduction, this is equivalent to a gross income of  $51,700. As a 
result, in many cases only a fraction of the wife’s initial earnings will be subject 
to the full 48 percent rate. This would not affect the reduction in the dead- 
weight loss since the deadweight loss depends only on the marginal tax rate. 
But when only a fraction of  the women’s income is originally taxed at the 
higher rate, the net revenue loss is reduced and may even be reversed to pro- 
duce a revenue gain. 
Consider for example a couple with one child in which the husband initially 
earns $40,000 and the wife initially earns $25,000. Their gross income is 
$65,000, and their taxable income is $51,300. She initially pays a 48 percent 
tax on $13,300 of her earnings (the excess over $38,000) and a 35 percent tax 
on the remaining $11,700. Reducing her tax rate to 35 percent on all of  her 
income only reduces her tax liability by $1,729 on her original earnings. With 
a marginal tax rate reduction from 48 percent to 35 percent and an uncompen- 
sated elasticity of  0.8, she increases her pretax  earnings from $25,000 to 
15. If the 48 percent initial marginal tax rate is paid on only part of  her income, the revenue 
loss from reducing her tax rate to 35 percent would be  less while the improvement in the dead- 
weight loss would be unchanged. We return to this in the text below. 46  Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
$30,000 and pays a tax of $1,750 on the incremental earnings. Her net tax 
payment therefore actually rises by $21. The reduction in the deadweight loss 
remains unchanged at 0.093wL = $2,325. Thus in this realistic case the dead- 
weight loss reduction is substantial even though there is no revenue loss at all. 
Before exploring these issues further with the help of the TAXSIM model’s 
simulations, we  consider in detail a more analytically complete  model  that 
distinguishes the separate effects of the tax rate on women’s participation deci- 
sions and on the average hours worked by those who do participate. 
2.2  Effects of Participation and Hours Responses to Marginal Tax 
Rate Reductions 
Calculating  the  deadweight  loss  and  the  revenue  effects  of  tax-induced 
changes in the married women’s labor force participation rate is quite different 
from  calculating  the  deadweight  loss  and  revenue  effects  of  tax-induced 
changes in average working hours among the employed  women.  It is useful 
therefore to consider each component of total labor supply separately and then 
to combine the separate results. We  also show how the change in the dead- 
weight loss and in revenue are related to the household’s welfare gain. 
2.2.1  Effect of the Hours Distortion on Deadweight Loss, Revenue, and 
Household Welfare 
We begin with the effects of the marginal tax rate on the hours worked by 
those wives who are employed. To illustrate the calculation we again assume 
that a representative  married woman initially pays a marginal tax rate of 48 
percent on her entire earnings and that this is reduced to  35 percent by the 
change in tax rules. As already noted, if the 48 percent rate applies to only part 
of her earnings, this assumption causes us to overstate the revenue loss but not 
the improvement in the deadweight loss. Following Eissa (1995) we take the 
elasticity of  hours with respect to the net of tax share to be .sH = 0.45. Since 
the change in the deadweight loss and in the revenue are both proportional  to 
the initial wage income, we need not specify numerical values for either the 
wage (w)  or the initial hours (HI  ). 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the reduction in the deadweight loss as the marginal 
tax rate is reduced from t, = 0.48 to t, = 0.35 and hours increase on the com- 
pensated supply curve from HI  to H,. The deadweight loss reduction is equiva- 
lent to the shaded trapezoid bounded by the labor supply curve (SS) and the 
wage line (w) between the initial hours HI  and the final hours H,: 
ADWL =-[t,w(H, -  H,)  + 0.5(tl -  t2)w(H, -  HI)] 47  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
Hl  H2  Hours 
Fig. 2.1  Deadweight loss-participants 
where cH  = [(l -  t,)w/H,][dH/d(l  -  t)w].  Substituting t, = 0.48, t, = 0.35, 
and E,  = 0.45 implies ADWL = -O.O47wH,. 
The revenue effect of reducing the marginal tax rate from t,  to tz  is 
(8)  A Rev = (t, -  t,)  wH, + t,wAH, 
where AH is the increase in hours implied by the uncompensated labor supply 
function. That is, the revenue effect is the combination of the revenue loss from 
the reduced tax rate applied to the initial labor income offset in part by the 
additional revenue  that results from the increased number of  hours worked. 
Following the usual Slutsky decomposition, 
(9)  AH = {dH/d(l -  t)}COMPd(l -  t)  + (dH/dy)dy, 
where  dy  is  the  decrease  in  taxes  with  no  behavioral  response:  dy  = 
(t, -  t,)wH,. Thus 
(10)  AH  = E,  H,[d(l -  t)/(l -  t)] + w-'(dwH/dy)(t, -  tz)wH,. 
Since those who are not initially participating do not have any income effect, 
the entire effect of  a change in exogenous income is concentrated on those 
who are already  working.  Previous estimates of  this  income effect  suggest 
dwHldy = -0.15.I6 Substituting this into equation (10) and using E,  = 0.45 
and d(l -  t)/(l -  t)  = 0.25 implies 
AH = [0.45(0.25) -  0.15(0.13)]HI = 0.093HI. 
16. This is analogous to the simplifying assumption in the previous section that (1 -  t)dwW 
dy = 0.10. 48  Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
Finally, substituting this expression for the change in hours into equation (8) 
yields the change in revenue: 
ARev = (r2 -  t,)wH, + r,wAH 
= [-0.13  + 0.35 (0.093)]wH1 
= -0.0975wH’. 
Thus, among those who are already working, the reduction in the marginal 
tax  rate from 48 percent  to 35 percent reduces revenue by  0.O975wHl and 
reduces the deadweight loss by 0.047wH‘. 
When there is already a tax in place, the reduction in the deadweight loss 
that follows from a decline in the tax rate is not the same as the direct gain in 
the welfare of the individual household. If the decline in the deadweight loss 
is accompanied  by  a loss of  revenue to the Treasury, that  revenue is  still a 
gain to the household although not to society as a whole. The reduction of the 
deadweight loss therefore understates the gain to the household. Conversely, if 
the decline in the deadweight  loss is accompanied by a rise in revenue, the 
decline of  the deadweight  loss overstates the gain to the household.”  Figure 
2.1 shows that the net welfare gain to the woman has two components. First, 
on her initial earnings she would pay less tax; her net income would rise by 
(tl -  t,)wH,. To this extent, her gain is the Treasury’s loss. But the increased 
hours that  she works  are compensated at a net of  tax  wage  (1 - t,)~  that 
exceeds her required supply price along the SS compensated supply curve. Her 
surplus on these incremental hours is the triangle 03  t, -  t2)w(  H2 -  HI  ). 
(11) 
Thus, the working woman’s total gain is 
AW = (tl -  t,)wH, + 0.5(t, -  t,)w(H2 -  HI) 
= (tl -  t,)wH, + 0.5(t1 -  t,)E,[(t,  -  fJ(1  -  t,)]wH,. 
Substituting numerical values for t, = 0.48, t2 = 0.35, and .sH = 0.45 yields 
AW  = 0.137wHI.  The additional hours that the woman works increases her 
welfare by an amount equal to a little more than 5 percent of her pretax labor 
income. 
Note that the triangle that represents the woman’s surplus gain from working 
more hours is equal to the decline in the deadweight loss reduced by the gain 
in revenue that the government receives r2w(H2 -  HI)  as a result of the in- 
creased work along the compensated supply curve. The government’s net reve- 
nue gain (excluding the revenue impact of the income effect on work) is this 
increased revenue (t2w(H2  -  HI))  minus the revenue lost on the initial earnings 
((t,  -  t,)wH,).  Thus the woman’s gain is equal to the decline in the deadweight 
17. More precisely, these statements are true if  the revenue changes associated with changes in 
labor supply are measured along the compensated labor supply curve. This is explained further in 
the text that follows. 49  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
loss minus the net revenue gain of the government (excluding the revenue im- 
pact of the income effect on work). 
We now turn to the corresponding calculations for the effect of the tax on 
participation and then combine the effects for the two groups. 
2.2.2  Effect of the Participation Distortion on Deadweight Loss, Revenue, 
and Household Welfare 
A reduction in the tax rate faced by mamed women increases the number 
of women  who choose to work.  More formally, it increases the number  of 
women  for whom  the  net-of-tax  wage  exceeds the  reservation  wage.  Eissa 
(1995) estimates that the elasticity of participation with respect to the net-of- 
tax share is 0.42, implying that reducing the tax rate from 48 percent to 35 
percent  would  increase the participation  rate  from 0.46 (in her  sample) to 
about 0.51.'* 
There is of course no change in the deadweight loss among women who 
remain  out of the  labor force after the reduction  in the tax rate. All of the 
deadweight  loss reduction  among those who are initially nonparticipants is 
among those women who go from being nonparticipants to being participants. 
Modeling the reduction in the deadweight loss is complicated by two fac- 
tors. First, we do not know how many hours would be worked by those women 
who would enter the labor force if their tax rate were reduced. In the current 
analysis we therefore assume that those who enter the labor force in response 
to the lower marginal tax rate would then choose to work the same number of 
hours that previous participants work, H,. 
The second complication is that we do not know the reservation  wage of 
those who shift into the labor force when the tax rate declines. All we know is 
that the net reservation wage is higher than (1 -  t,)w  since they did not work 
at that wage and that it is not higher than  (1 - r2)w  since they do work at 
that wage. Fortunately, although the precise magnitude of the deadweight loss 
depends on the level of the reservation  wage, the analysis in this section and 
the  simulations in  section 2.4 show that for many possible tax changes the 
uncertainty about the reservation wage produces only a relatively small uncer- 
tainty  about  the  magnitude  of  the  deadweight  loss. We calculate  the dead- 
weight loss at the extreme values of the reservation wage (i.e., at (1 -  t,)w  and 
These issues are illustrated in figure 2.2. The pretax wage is shown as w. 
The individual initially faces a net wage of (1 -  t,)w  at which she chooses to 
work zero hours. Her reservation  wage is shown as (1 -  t*)w, where  t*  is 
unknown to us as analysts. Increases in the net wage above (1 -  t*)w induce 
her to move to higher desired hours along the labor supply curve S  that starts 
(1 -  t2)W). 
18. This reflects the fact that there is no income effect since those women who are not working 
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0  H2  Hours worked 
Fig. 2.2  Deadweight loss-nonparticipants 
at the point with zero hours and net wage (1 -  t*)w and passes through the 
point with coordinates (1 -  t,)w and H2.  We do not observe intermediate points 
on that labor supply curve because her labor supply jumps to H, hours when 
the available wage jumps to (1 -  t,)w. 
The reduction  of  the  deadweight  loss consists  of  the  shaded  trapezoid 
bounded  by  the  gross  wage  level  and the  labor  supply  line between  labor 
supply of  zero and H,.  For all of  those  who are induced to participate, the 
deadweight loss falls by at least the rectangle t2wH,, the revenue that the gov- 
ernment collects when people are no longer discouraged from participating in 
the labor force. In addition, the deadweight loss falls by the amount indicated 
by the triangle with area 0.5(t* -  tJwH,.  Since the reservation  wage is un- 
known, we will write this as 0.5A(t, -  t2)wH,  where 0 <  A < 1. 
Combining the two parts shows that the total change in the deadweight loss 
is given by 
(12)  ADWL = -[t,wH,  + 0.5A(t, -  t,)wH,] 
= -[t2 + 0.5A(tl -  t,)]wH,. 
Since t, = 0.35 and 0.5(tl -  t2)  = 0.065, the uncertainty about the magnitude 
of the reservation wage cannot influence the deadweight loss estimate by more 
than  19 percent  (i.e., 0.06Y0.35 = 0.19) for those women who are initially 
nonparticipants. For those  who  become  employed, the  reduced  deadweight 
loss lies between 0.35wH2  and O.415wH2.  More general tax reforms can create 
greater uncertainty  about the reservation  wage and the deadweight loss if the 
resulting value of t2  is substantially less than t,,  for example, a separate filing 
system that reduces the personal income tax for the married women to zero. 
To aggregate this with the deadweight loss calculated for those who were 
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the postchange hours H, in equation (12)  must be restated in terms of the initial 
hours, HI.  Since equation (10) implies that the increase in hours among partici- 
pants was equal to 0.093HI,  it follows that H, = 1.093H1  and therefore that the 
reduced deadweight loss among those who were not initially in the labor force 
but who are induced by the tax reduction to join the labor force lies between 
0.35(1.093)wHl = 0.38wH, per new participant and 0.45wH1  per new partici- 
pant. The actual aggregation is discussed below after we comment on the reve- 
nue effect of the reduced tax rate for this group. 
The revenue effect of the lower tax rate for those who are initially  not in 
the labor force is unambiguously positive.  Since none of  these women were 
employed before the tax rate reduction, there is no decrease in initial tax reve- 
nue. The revenue effect for each woman who shifts from not working to work- 
ing H, hours is 
(13)  ARev = t2wHZ. 
Restating H2  as 1.093Hl implies that ARev = 0.38Hl for each new participant. 
The welfare gain to the individual household depends on the woman’s reser- 
vation wage. If the reservation wage is almost exactly equal to the net wage 
after the tax reduction (t* = t,), virtually the entire reduction in the deadweight 
loss accrues to the  government  in  the  form of  increased revenue.  This is a 
special case of  the  statement made earlier that, for those women  who were 
initially working, the gain to the woman is the reduction in the deadweight loss 
minus the government’s net revenue gain (excluding the revenue impact of the 
income effect on work effort.) In this case, the reduced deadweight loss is just 
the government revenue gain so there is no gain (i.e., no reduced deadweight 
loss) for the woman. Of course, if the reservation wage is lower, there will be 
a net gain to the woman equal to the area of  the triangle 0.5(t* -  t,)wH, in 
figure 2.2, and the deadweight loss reduction exceeds the government’s revenue 
gain by that amount.I9 
2.2.3  Combined Effect on Deadweight Loss and Revenue for 
All Mamed Women 
The total of the effect on those who are initially employed and the effect on 
those who enter the labor force depends on the initial distribution between 
those who are in the labor force and those who are not and the increase in the 
fraction in the labor force that results from the tax rate reduction. To illustrate 
this  calculation  we use the figures  based  on Eissa’s  sample: 46  percent  of 
women are initially in the labor force so that, with a participation elasticity of 
0.42 with respect to the net-of-tax rate, the tax rate reduction from 48 percent 
to 35 percent raises the participation rate to 5 1 percent. 
We can now put the pieces together and calculate the reduced deadweight 
19. In the case of women who were previously nonparticipants, there is no income effect of the 
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loss per 100 married women. Since the deadweight loss per employed woman 
is reduced by 0.047wHl and there are 46 employed women per  100 married 
women,  the  reduced  deadweight  loss from this  source is 0.047(46)wHl = 
2.16wHl per  100 women. Similarly, since the deadweight loss is reduced by 
between 0.38wHI and 0.45wHl for each woman who enters the labor force and 
5 women per  100 married women are induced to enter the labor force by the 
reduced tax rate, the reduced deadweight loss among initial nonparticipants is 
equal to between 1.90wHI  and 2.25wHl per 100 women. Combining these two 
shows that the overall deadweight loss reduction per  100 married women is 
between  4.06wHl per  100 married  women  and  4.41wH1 per  100 married 
women. In this case, the uncertainty introduced by not knowing the reservation 
wage is less than I0 percent of the total reduced deadweight loss. 
The revenue effect of the reduced tax rate can be calculated in the same way. 
Since lowering the tax rate from 48 to 35 percent reduces tax revenue among 
employed women by  0.0975wHl and there are 46 employed women per  100 
married women, the revenue loss among those who are initially employed is 
4.48wHl per  100 married  women.  Among  those  who  are not  initially  em- 
ployed, the rate reduction induces a revenue gain of 0.38wHI per newly em- 
ployed  person.  Since the lower tax  rate induces 5 women  per  100 married 
women to join the labor force, the increased revenue is l.90wHl.  The combined 
revenue effect is therefore a net loss of 2.58wHl per 100 married women. 
Comparing the change in the deadweight loss and the change in the revenue 
shows that reducing the marginal tax rate from 48 to 35 percent would reduce 
the deadweight loss by at least 4.06wHl per 100 married women while reduc- 
ing revenue by 2.58wHl per 100 married women. In rough terms, there is $1.57 
of deadweight loss avoided for every dollar of lost revenue. Equivalently, there 
is a real net resource loss of $1.57 for every dollar of revenue raised by taxing 
married women at 48 instead of 35 percent. Since the revenue loss could pre- 
sumably be offset with a much smaller deadweight loss by other tax changes, 
a reform that reduces the marginal federal income tax rate on married women 
from 28 to 15 percent (and therefore reduces the overall marginal tax rate from 
48 to 35 percent) could increase the overall efficiency of the income tax. 
It is worth emphasizing that, among women who are initially out of the labor 
force, the participation effect not only reduces the deadweight loss but actually 
increases revenue at the same time. Since some previous  estimates of the re- 
sponse of  married women to taxes suggest that the participation response is 
even more important than the 0.42 elasticity that we have assumed,zo  our calcu- 
lations here may underestimate the relative advantage of lowering the marginal 
tax rate  on married  women.  This is reinforced to the  extent  that the  initial 
20. Triest (1990) suggests that the response of total hours to increases in the net-of-tax share is 
about the same as Eissa’s estimates but that almost all of that response comes through increased 
participation. The TAXSIM simulations presented below include an explicit analysis of the sensi- 
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average tax rate on those married women who are working is less than their 
marginal rate so that the rate reduction involves a smaller loss of revenue. 
2.3  Adapting the TAXSIM Model to Analyze the Effects of Tax 
Reforms on Married Women 
Although the detailed examination of a group of representative middle-class 
married women in section 2.2 indicates that there may be substantial efficiency 
gains from changing the tax rules that apply to two-earner families, it is im- 
portant to go beyond these simplified examples and consider how changes in 
tax rules would affect the entire population of married women. Microsimula- 
tion analysis with the NBER TAXSIM model permits taking into account a 
variety of complexities, including the initial pattern of labor force participation 
and the relations between wives’ earnings and other family income. 
To carry out this analysis, the usual TAXSIM model had to be augmented in 
several ways. These changes are described in the current section. The TAXSIM 
model combines a stratified random sample of more than 100,000 tax returns 
provided by the Internal Revenue Service with a computer program that incor- 
porates the current income tax rules and the ability to modify those rules and 
calculate the effects of alternative tax rules on taxable income, deadweight 
loss, and the like. The model can reflect the behavioral responses of taxpayers 
to changes in tax rates and tax rules. As noted above, the behavioral responses 
that we study in the current paper focus on changes in married women’s labor 
supply through changes in participation and in average hours worked.21 
The TAXSIM model used in the current paper incorporates the Treasury’s 
public-use sample of individual tax returns for 1991, the most recent sample 
that is currently available. Since this study is concerned exclusively with alter- 
native tax rules for married women, the usual TAXSIM sample is reduced to 
married couples. These tax returns are augmented with data from the March 
1992 Current Population  Survey (CPS) in order to have information  on the 
separate earnings of  husbands and wives and to go beyond the very limited 
information  on  taxpayer age provided  in  the Treasury’s public-use  sample 
(whether the taxpayer claims one or more age exemptions for being over age 
65).  When this information has been added to the tax return file we can use 
earlier estimates by Feldstein and Samwick (1992) of the present value of so- 
cial security retirement and survivor benefits to calculate the net marginal so- 
cial security payroll tax for each individual. 
21. Although the basic TAXSIM model and data are very similar to those used by the Office of 
Tax Analysis at the Treasury Department and by the staff of the Congressional Joint Tax Commit- 
tee, the nature of  our simulations is  very  different. The official revenue estimators impose on 
themselves the restriction that the behavioral responses that they estimate must not change nominal 
GDP. See Feldstein (1994, 1996) for a discussion of the current procedures of the revenue estima- 
tors and of the reasons for looking beyond the narrow range of behavior that they do take into ac- 
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Data from the CPS is added to the tax return information by matching each 
couple in the tax file to a couple in the CPS. To do this, the CPS couples are 
cross-classified into 109 types by four criteria: total wages of the husband and 
wife together, interest and dividend income, number of children, and whether 
the taxpayer and/or the spouse is over age 65. Each TAXSIM record is then 
matched  to a CPS record randomly  selected  from among the CPS records 
whose wage category, interest and dividend income category, number of de- 
pendents, and age 65-plus status match the TAXSIM record exactly. The earn- 
ings of the husband and of the wife are then imputed to the TAXSIM record in 
a way that preserves the taxpayer's combined wage and salary income (line 1 
of form  1040) while making the ratio of the wife's  wage and salary to the 
combined wage and salary conform to the ratio in the CPS data. The CPS 
record was also used to impute the age of the primary earner. 
The resulting data for 1991 were "aged"  to  1994 to reflect the expected 
increase in the number of tax returns and the rise in incomes. In addition, the 
1994 baseline incomes were adjusted to reflect taxpayers' assumed responses 
to the four major aspects of the 1993 tax legislation:22  (1) the increase in the 
top marginal  tax  rate  from  31 to  36 percent  on  taxable  incomes between 
$140,000  and  $250,000  and  to  39.6  percent  on  taxable  incomes  over 
$250,000,23 (2) the elimination of the $135,000 ceiling on the tax base for 
the Medicare (health insurance) payroll tax, (3) the changes in the alternative 
minimum tax, and (4)  the changes in the earned income tax credit. 
The TAXSIM analysis of alternative tax rules for married women follows 
the  simplified assumption  of  focusing  exclusively on the participation  and 
hours decisions of the married women. We ignore other changes in their behav- 
ior that alter taxable income as well as all changes in the behavior of men and 
single women. We assume also that the pretax wage rate is constant. The two 
key behavioral elasticities, based on Eissa (1995), are the compensated elastic- 
ities of hours with respect to the net-of-tax wage among women who work 
under existing tax rules (E"  = 0.45) and the elasticity of the participation rate 
with respect to the net-of-tax share (E~  = 0.42). As discussed above, we take 
the effect of exogenous income on the demand for leisure hours consumed to 
be  $0.15  of  foregone  wage  income  per  incremental  dollar  of  exogenous 
income. 
Because the TAXSIM model does not currently incorporate  1994 state in- 
come tax rates, they are ignored in the current analysis. This reduces the initial 
and final overall tax rate levels and therefore decreases the reduction in the 
deadweight loss that results from reducing the tax rate. 
In contrast to the simplified analyses of sections 2.1 and 2.2, we now incor- 
porate a more realistic treatment of the social security tax to reflect the present 
22. This adjustment follows the procedures described in Feldstein (199%). 
23. These are the changes for married couples filing joint tax returns. Other changes were made 
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actuarial value of future benefits. We also recognize that the taxpayer’s income 
is defined net of the employer’s share of the social security payroll tax. Each 
$100 of taxable wage income up to a maximum taxable wage level of $60,600 
for 1994 is subject to an extra tax of  $7.65. This indicates that the full gross 
wage is $107.65 per $100 of taxable wage income, implying that $100 of tax- 
able wage income corresponds to a marginal product of labor of $107.65. 
We now make this more precise by describing the explicit calculation used 
to evaluate the deadweight loss and revenue effects of  the existing tax rules 
and of potential alternative tax rules. We follow the framework of section 2.2 
by  dividing the sample of married couples into those with a working spouse 
(i.e., a wife with wage and salary income in 1994) and those in which the wife 
was not in the labor force. 
2.3.1  Subsample of Working Wives 
The initial marginal tax rate of the working wife is 
t  = tPlT + tH1 + tSSN  (14)  11  I  I 
where  tYIT is the marginal tax rate under the personal income tax, ty  is the 
employer-employee combined payroll tax for health insurance (Medicare), and 
tssN  is the net employer-employee payroll tax for social security. The subscript 
1 indicates that this is the initial tax rate; a subscript 2 is used to denote the 
postreform tax rate. Each of these components needs some further comment. 
The marginal tax rate under the personal income tax is defined as a fraction 
of the full gross wage (the marginal product of labor). If the woman earns less 
than the $60,600 (the social security maximum covered earnings in 1994), the 
employer pays a payroll tax of 7.65 percent, implying that each dollar of tax- 
able income corresponds to $1.0765 of marginal product. A 28 percent statu- 
tory tax rate on taxable income therefore corresponds to a tax rate of  0.28/ 
1.0765 = 0.26 on the marginal product of labor. For such an individual, we 
therefore write tPET  = 0.26. If the woman’s income exceeds $60,600, she is no 
longer subject to the social security payroll tax on marginal earnings but is still 
subject to the 2.9 percent Medicare payroll tax. For such women, the employer 
pays a marginal payroll tax of 1.45 percent, implying that a 28 percent tax on 
taxable income is equivalent to ry = 0.28/1.0145 = 0.276 on the marginal 
product of labor. 
The health insurance payroll tax is ty  = 0.029/1.0765 = 0.0269 if the wom- 
an’s income is less than $60,600 and is t:’  = 0.029/1.0145  = 0.0286 if  the 
woman’s income exceeds $60,600. 
The social security payroll tax that influences the taxpayer’s behavior should 
reflect the present  actuarial value of  the future benefits that are accrued by 
earning an additional dollar of wage and salary income.24  For mamed women, 
24. The simplified calculations of sections 2.1 and 2.2 ignored this aspect of the social secu- 
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assessing the value of this incremental benefit is complicated by the fact that a 
woman may claim benefits at retirement based on her own earnings history or 
may  claim benefits  as her husband’s dependent  spouse. Since a  dependent 
spouse’s benefits are equal to 50 percent of the benefits of the primary retiree, 
a wife will choose to receive benefits  as a retired worker  (rather than as a 
dependent spouse) if her own lifetime earnings record implies a benefit level 
greater than 50 percent of her husband’s benefit level.2s  A second complication 
in calculating the present actuarial value of benefits is that a surviving spouse 
can receive benefits equal to 100 percent of her husband’s benefit or can receive 
the benefit to which she is entitled as a retired worker. Most married women 
will find it advantageous to claim such survivor benefits and therefore will get 
no extra benefit during the years that she is a widow for the taxes that she paid 
while she was working. 
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) estimated the present actuarial value of bene- 
fits for employees classified by age, sex, income, and prospective benefit status 
(e.g., male retiree  with dependent  spouse or female retiree without  depen- 
dents). Although it is not possible for us to reflect all of the complexities of the 
social security benefit rules on the basis of the information that we have in the 
augmented TAXSIM file, we do use the  Feldstein-Samwick  calculations to 
estimate the present actual value of retirement benefits for each woman in our 
sample.26  For this purpose, we classify a woman as a potential retired worker 
who will claim benefits on the basis of  her own earnings only if her current 
wage and salary places her at a point in the earnings distribution at which her 
individual benefit would exceed the benefit to which she would be entitled as 
a dependent spouse. 
The marginal social security tax rate t:SN is the difference between the gross 
social security tax rate (0.124 if her wage and salary income is less than the 
$60,600 social security maximum and zero if her wage and salary income is 
higher) and the present actuarial value of benefits (pavb) derived by Feldstein 
and Samwick divided by the marginal product of labor per dollar of  taxable 
income. Thus a woman with wage and salary income below $60,600 has tssN = 
(0.124 -  pavb)/1.0765. If her income exceeds the maximum taxable earnings 
under social security, tssN = 0. 
Equation (7) in section 2.2.1 shows that the change in the deadweight loss 
due to a change in the marginal tax rate on married women workers is given by 
(15)  ADWL = -[t, + 0.5(t, -  t2)]  (t, -  t,)(l -  t,)-’&,E,, 
where t, is the marginal tax rate described in equation (14),  t2 is the corre- 
sponding marginal tax rate after the change in tax rules, sH  is the compensated 
25. The analysis is complicated further by her ability to retire earlier than her husband, claiming 
benefits at that time on her own record, and then shift to dependent spouse status when her hus- 
band retires. 
26. The Feldstein-Samwick estimates do not include the value of disability benefits. Such bene- 
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elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax  share, and El is the woman’s 
initial wage and salary income (corresponding to wH, of  eq. [7]). TAXSIM 
evaluates equation (15) for each individual in the subsample of married women 
who work. 
Calculating the revenue effect for each woman of  a change in the tax rule 
can be conceptually divided into two parts: (1) the “static” tax change and (2) 
the effect on revenue of the induced change in earnings. The static tax change 
calculation begins with the total tax paid under existing tax rules, T,,  defined 
to exclude the payroll taxes on the husband’s earnings. Thus the T,  tax measure 
consists of the couple’s initial personal income tax liability, plus the woman’s 
initial health insurance tax (0.029 El)  and the woman’s initial social security 
payroll tax (0.124E1  if El < $60,600 and zero if El > $60,600). The tax rules 
and tax rates are then revised, and the TAXSIM program is used to recalculate 
the  corresponding  tax  liability  under  the  new  rules  and rates  but  with  no 
changes in the initial incomes. We denote this tax burden under the new rules 
with the old income as T2.  The static change in the individual’s tax is therefore 
Although behavior is appropriately modeled in terms of the social security 
tax net of the present actuarial value of benefits, the Treasury’s currenf revenue 
receipts depend only on the gross social security tax. Since government budget 
accounting generally ignores the present value of future taxes and outlays, we 
calculate both a net revenue and a gross revenue change that ignores the present 
actuarial value of future benefits. More specifically, we take the value of bene- 
fits into account in modeling individual behavior but then calculate the revenue 
implications based only on the gross tax. Section 2.4 presents alternative reve- 
nue estimates based on net and gross social security revenue. 
Calculating the revenue effect of the individual change in earnings is based 
on equation (10) of section 2.2. Since we assume that the wage rate per hour 
(w) is fixed, we can multiply all of the terms in equation (10) by w and there- 
fore rewrite equation (10) in terms of earnings (E  = wH)as 
T2 -  TI. 
AE  = E,  El (tl -  f2)/(l -  tl) + (dE/&) (TI -  T2). 
Equation  (16) states the change in earnings as the  sum of the compensated 
percentage change in hours multiplied by the initial level of earnings plus the 
income effect on earnings of the reduction  in taxes with no behavioral  re- 
sponse. As we noted earlier, previous research indicates the income effect is 
commonly estimated at about dE/dy = -0.15. The total revenue effect is there- 
fore calculated by TAXSIM with the new tax rules and tax rates applied to the 
new level of earnings, El + AE. 
2.3.2  Subsample of Wives Initially out of the Labor Force 
If the proportion of women under age 65 who are initially employed is p,, 
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For any woman who is initially out of the labor force, the probability of enter- 
ing the labor force is Apl(  1 -  p,). 
In calculating the deadweight loss and the revenue, our baseline assumption 
is that women who shift from being out of the labor force to being employed 
have the same pretax earnings when they are employed as the average earnings 
of the previously employed women under the new tax rules (i.e., the mean of 
E, + AE).27  We also present simulation results that assume that new entrants 
have only  one-half  of  the average earnings of  previously  employed  women 
under the new tax rules. 
From the  analysis of  section 2.2.2, the reduced  deadweight  loss for new 
participants lies between a lower bound that is just equal to the tax that they 
pay under the new tax rules and an upper bound that is an unweighted average 
of that tax and the tax that they would pay on the same earnings under the old 
tax rules.**  TAXSIM therefore derives the lower bound on the change in the 
deadweight loss for those who shift into employment by calculating, under the 
new tax rules, the change in the couple’s personal income tax associated with 
the wife’s new employment plus her payroll tax payments. The upper bound 
on the change in  the  deadweight loss is calculated  by  averaging  the  lower 
bound figure with the taxes that would occur under the old tax rates and rules 
with the new participation and hours. 
Our TAXSIM procedure multiplies the potential reduced deadweight loss 
for each woman who is initially out of the labor force by the probability  that 
she will enter the labor force. TAXSIM can therefore simply add these proba- 
bility-weighted deadweight loss reductions over all of the observations in the 
sample of nonworking wives. 
The revenue changes and deadweight loss reductions for the two subsamples 
taken together  give the total changes in revenue and deadweight loss for all 
married women. 
2.4  Tax Reform Options 
In this paper, we analyze four different types of  alternatives to the current 
method of taxing two-earner couples. Section 2.4.1 discusses proposals to rein- 
state the secondary earner deduction that was repealed in the 1986 tax reform 
legislation. Section 2.4.2 considers other innovations within the framework of 
joint filing that have the effect of  reducing the marginal tax rate on married 
27. This is analogous to the assumption of  section 2.2.2 that those women who enter the labor 
force work the same H,  hours as previous employees. This subject could obviously benefit from 
more extensive analysis based on panel data. It may also be possible to refine the analysis of the 
probability of  shifting from out of  the labor force to employment to reflect information about 
the individual’s spouse, children, age, etc., that are in the TAXSIM file but not currently taken 
into account. 
28. See eq. (12) of section 2.2.2 and note that X = 1 implies ADWL = -0.5  (t,  + fz) wL. 59  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
women. Section 2.4.3 then discusses separate filing as an alternative to the 
current joint filing rule. Finally, section 2.4.4 analyzes the effect of eliminating 
the extra marginal tax rate imposed by social security on married women. 
For each option, we calculate the effects on earnings, on tax revenue, and 
on the deadweight loss of the tax system. Finally, we examine the impact on 
the marriage penalty  as well  as on the marriage bonus.  For the secondary 
earner deduction, we also discuss the sensitivity of the analysis to alternative 
values of the labor supply elasticities and present disaggregated results by in- 
come class. 
Before looking at any of  the alternative tax rules, we present estimates of 
the current tax situation of married taxpayers that can serve as a background 
for putting the effects of the individual options in perspective. Table 2.1 shows 
1994 average and aggregate tax revenues for married taxpayers (with tax liabil- 
ities greater than zero) in each taxable income class starting with $10,000 of 
adjusted gross income (AGI).29  The table presents the personal income tax 
(PIT),  the  employee-employer  payments  of  the  social  security  payroll  tax 
(OASDHF), and the total federal tax (the sum of the personal income tax and 
the employer-employee payroll tax). 
In the aggregate, these 5 1 million married taxpayers paid total personal in- 
come taxes of $384 billion, approximately 70 percent of the estimated personal 
income taxes paid by all taxpayers. Similarly, these couples and their employ- 
ers paid OASDHI payroll tax of $292 billion, about 63 percent of the estimated 
1994 total OASDHI receipts for all taxpayers. 
Table 2.2 presents  comparable baseline  figures for the marriage penalty, 
showing, by AGI class, the number of couples that are now paying a marriage 
penalty (i.e., that pay more personal income tax than they would if they were 
unmarried) and the average penalty among such couples. Similarly, the table 
shows the number of couples that are now enjoying a marriage bonus (i.e., 
paying less personal income tax than they would if they were not married) and 
the average bonus for such couples. In the aggregate, there are now 20 million 
couples (40 percent) paying marriage penalties that total  $37 billion  while 
there are also 27 million couples (54 percent) receiving marriage bonuses that 
total $41 billion. Thus for married taxpayers as a whole, the effect of marriage 
is to reduce taxes. Among taxpayers with AGIs over $50,000, however, the 
opposite is true. 
2.4.1  Secondary Earner Deduction 
A 10 percent “secondary earner deduction” was a feature of the income tax 
law from 1981 until it was repealed in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It allowed 
the couple to deduct from taxable income 10 percent of the wage and salary 
income of the spouse with the lower earnings, up to a maximum deduction of 
29. A married couple with AGI below $10,000 owes no tax because the combination of  two 
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Table 2.1  Distribution of Aggregate and Average Tax Revenues: Joint Tax 
Returns, 1994 
Averages per Return  Aggregates 
AGI  Number 
Class  of Returns  PIT +  PIT + 
(thousands $)  (thousands)  PIT  OASDHI'  OASDHI'  PIT  OASDHF  OASDHI' 
10-  9,258  166  1,759  1,926  1.5  16.2  17.8 
25-  16,968  3,092  4,610  7.702  52.4  78.2  130.6 
50-  16,408  8,398  8,495  16,893  137.7  139.3  277.1 
100-  3,389  23,640  12,609  36,249  80.1  42.7  122.8 
200+  795  144,491  15,225  159,717  114.8  12.1  126.9 
Total  50,731  7,575  5,754  13,329  384.2  291.9  676.2 
Source: Estimates are based on TAXSIM model calculations using the 1991 Treasury public-use 
sample aged to 1994 levels. 
Note: Averages per return are in dollars. Aggregates are in billions of dollars. All figures for 1994. 
Table 2.2  Couples with Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses 
Couples with Marriage Penalty  Couples with Marriage Bonus 
AGI  Number 
Class  of Returns  Number  Average Amount  Number  Average Amount 
(thousand $)  (thousands)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
10-  9,258  1,527 
25-  16,968  7,774 
50-  16,408  8,328 
100-  3,389  2,164 
200+  795  399 
Mean 
Total  50,731  20,270 
(40.0 percent) 
1,729  7,102  730 
1,413  9,156  1,332 
1,542  7,991  2,122 
3,062  1,224  4,079 
9,648  368  4,080 
1,833  1,533 
37.Ia  26,975  41.3" 
(53.2 percent) 
Source: Estimates are based on TAXSIM model calculations using the 1991 Treasury public-use 
sample aged to 1994 levels. 
Note: Averages per return are in dollars. All figures for 1994. 
"In billions of dollars. 
$3,000. For married women with wage and salary income below $30,000, the 
deduction of  10 percent of earnings is equivalent to a 10 percent reduction in 
the tax rate on those 
In addition to analyzing the original pre- 1986 plan, we recognize that nomi- 
nal per capita income has nearly doubled since the $30,000 limit was set in 
30. Since the secondary earner deduction reduces taxable income but not AGI, it does not affect 
any of the tax deductions that themselves depend on the level of AGI. The secondary earner deduc- 
tion is discussed in detail with an explicit example in Feldstein (1995b) as an illustration of the 
importance of taking taxpayer labor supply behavior into account in evaluating tax proposals. 61  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
198  1. We therefore consider the effect of raising the maximum deduction to 
$5,000 (i.e., a deduction of 10 percent of the first $50,000 of wage and salary 
income). 
Row 1 of table 2.3 presents the results of our analysis of the original second- 
ary earner  deduction  with  the  $3,000 limit. The reduced  marginal tax  rate 
would  cause  the  pretax  earnings  of  married  women  with  earnings  below 
$30,000 to increase while those with incomes over $30,000 would decline (by 
$450 each) because of the income effect. The aggregate effect of  this would 
be a $5.7 billion net increase in pretax earnings, shown in column (1). 
This increase in earnings is reflected  in  the difference between the  static 
revenue change shown in column (2) and the revenue change with behavior 
shown in columns (3), (4), and (5). With no change in behavior, the static reve- 
nue loss is $7.2 billion. The $5.7 billion net increase in earnings cuts the loss 
of  personal income tax revenue from $7.2 to $6.1 billion, shown in column 
(3).31  In addition, the increased earnings that result from greater labor force 
participation  and  greater working  hours also increase the payroll  taxes that 
these women and their employers pay. This revenue gain is shown in column 
(4) as the positive change in OASDHF; the superscript G identifies this as the 
change in full payroll tax revenue without any offset for the present actuarial 
value of future retirement benefits. The total increase in OASDHI payroll tax 
revenue that results from the higher earnings is $0.9 billion (col. [4]),  bringing 
the net revenue loss of the secondary earner deduction down to $5.2 billion 
(col. [5].)32  In this case, the static revenue loss overstates the estimated net loss 
by $2.0  billion, or 38 percent. 
Columns (6) and (7) report the aggregate change in the deadweight loss of 
the tax system, giving both a lower bound estimate and an upper bound esti- 
mate.33  Since the reductions in marginal tax rates are relatively small, the range 
of possible reservation wages for new participants is also small. Our inability 
to know the reservation  wage precisely therefore does not affect any conclu- 
31. It is wrong to interpret the ratio of  the additional income tax  to the additional earnings 
(0.193) as an average marginal tax rate of  19.3 percent since the $5.7 billion earnings increase is 
the net effect  of  earnings increases of  women with lower earnings and earnings decreases of 
women with higher earnings (and typically higher marginal tax rates). 
32. The difference between the gross OASDHI revenue and the corresponding revenue net of 
the present value of future benefits is very small because most married women, and particularly 
those with the lower earnings who increase their earnings in response to the deduction, will claim 
retirement benefits as dependent spouses. We estimate that the present value of the benefits offsets 
only about 10 percent of the extra gross payroll tax revenue. If the present value of future social 
security retirement benefits is taken into account, the net OASDHI revenue is reduced to $0.8 
billion and the overall net revenue loss rises to $5.3 billion. 
33. The lower and upper bounds on the deadweight loss reduction reflect the uncertainty of the 
reservation wage of those who shift from nonparticipants to participants (as explained in sec. 2.2 
of this paper). The lower bound estimate corresponds to A  = 0 in eq. (1  I), and the upper bound 
estimate corresponds to  A  = 1. The lower bound assumes that the woman is just indifferent be- 
tween working and not working after the tax change, while the upper bound estimate assumes that 
she was just indifferent between workjng and not working before the tax change. In the lower 
bound case, all of the reduced deadweight loss accrues in the form of increased tax revenue. Table 2.3  Revenue and Deadweight Loss Effects of Alternative Tax Rules 
Change in 
Deadweight 
Deadweight  of  Revenue 
Change in  Loss per Dollar 
Revenue Change with Behavior  Loss  Loss  Marriage Penalty  Marriage Bonus 
Static 
Change in  Revenue  Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper 
Earnings  Change  PIT  OASDHF  PIT+OASDHIG  Bound  Bound  Bound  Bound  Percentage  Average  Percentage  Average 
Description  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5  )  (6)  (7)  (8a)  (8b)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
I.  Secondary earner 
deduction: 
I0 percent of 
first $30,000 
2.  Secondary earner 
deduction: 




15 percent rate 
on first $50,000 
secondary earner 
wages: Optional 
20 percent rate 
on first $50.000 
3. Flat rate on 





-7.2  -6.1  0.9  -5.2  -3.1  -3.2  0.60  0.62  36  1,627.0  56  1,465.0 
-7.9  -6.3  1.1  -5.2  -3.8  -3.9  0.72  0.73  36  1,593.0  56  1,468.0 
-27.1  -23.0  4.2  -  18.8  -11.5  -12.9  0.61  0.69  31  1,242.0  62  1,623.0 
-14.9  -12.0  2.2  -9.8  -7.0  -7.6  0.71  0.77  35  1,409.0  58  1,499.0 5.  Special 
secondary earner 
tax schedule: 






























-  12.5 
-11.8 
0.0 
-59.0  9.5  -49.5  -  18.4  -27.3  0.37  0.55 
-48.2  8.1  -40.1  -15.4  -24.2  0.38  0.60 
-6.9  6.9  0.0  -13.2  -19.3  n.a.  n.a. 
-6.4  6.5  0.1  -12.5  -18.3  n.a.  n.a. 





















Source: Estimates are based on TAXSIM model calculations using the 1991 Treasury public-use sample aged to 1994 levels. 
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sions about the desirability of reviving  the secondary earner deduction. We 
also report (col. [S]) the ratio of the reduction in the deadweight loss to the net 
revenue loss ($5.2 billion), a ratio of 0.60 with the lower bound estimate and 
0.62 with the upper bound estimate, implying that each dollar of revenue loss 
reduces the deadweight loss of the tax system by between 60 and 62 cents. 
Columns (9) through (12) show the effect of the secondary earner deduction 
on the marriage penalty and bonus. The secondary earner deduction reduces 
the marriage penalty for all taxpayers who currently face a marriage penalty 
since all married couples receive some tax reduction, including those with in- 
comes over $30,000. Column (9) shows that the percentage of couples with a 
marriage penalty  falls from the initial 40 percent  shown in  table 2.2 to 36 
percent. The average dollar amount per couple with a marriage penalty also 
falls, from $1,833 to $1,627. Finally, the couples with a marriage bonus rises 
from the initial 54 percent with an average bonus of $1,533 to 56 percent with 
an average bonus of $1,465. 
The second simulation (shown in row 2) examines the effect of a more gen- 
erous secondary earner deduction: a deduction of 10 percent of earnings up to 
a $5,000 limit. The surprising feature of this analysis is that the plan with the 
higher ceiling dominates the original secondary earner deduction: it has the 
same revenue loss but a greater reduction in the deadweight loss. This occurs 
because the pre-1986 secondary earner deduction plan shown in row 1 has no 
favorable  effect  on  the  incentives  of  women  with  initial  earnings  above 
$30,000 while nevertheless reducing the tax that they pay. Raising the ceiling 
to $50,000 provides  favorable incentives to enough women with initial earn- 
ings between these two limits to make the additional earnings of these higher- 
earning women pay for the entire increased static revenue loss. 
More specifically, the higher deduction limit raises the static revenue loss 
by  approximately $700 million, from $7.2 to $7.9 billion  (col. [2]). But the 
induced rise in earnings of $7.4 instead of $5.7 billion (col. [I])  brings enough 
extra tax revenue to offset the $700 million static revenue loss. Although the 
personal income tax revenue still declines by about $200 million (col. [3]), this 
is offset by the greater payroll tax revenue (col. [4]). 
With an overall revenue loss of $5.2 billion and a deadweight loss reduction 
of $3.8 billion, the deadweight loss reduction is about 72 cents per dollar of 
revenue loss (col. [S]). Raising the maximum secondary earner deduction also 
reduces the average marriage penalty. 
Table 2.4 disaggregates these results by five AGI class brackets. Although 
earnings rise at all income  levels, more than half  of  the  increase is among 
taxpayers with AGIs between $50,000 and $100,000. An additional one-third 
of the additional earnings is by couples with AGIs below $50,000. The distri- 
bution of the static tax reductions is also concentrated on taxpayers with AGIs 
between $50,000 and $100,000.  They receive more than half of the total static 
tax reduction. Less than $500 million  of  the $7.9 billion static revenue loss 
accrues to taxpayers with incomes over $200,000. Table 2.4  Distributional Effects of the Secondary Earner Deduction: 10 Percent of First $50,000 
Change in 
Deadweight 
Change in  Loss per Dollar 
Deadweight  of Revenue  Couples with  Couples with 
Revenue Change with Behavior  Loss  Loss  Marriage Penalty  Marriage Bonus 
Static 
AG1  Nunibcr  Change in  Rcvenuc  Lower  Upper  Lower  Uppcr  Avcrage  Average 
Class  of Rehims  Earnings  Change  PIT  OASDHI"  PIT+OASDHI"  Round  Bound  Round  Round  Number  Amount  Number  Amount 
(thousand $)  (thousand)  (I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  @a)  (Rh)  (9)  (10)  "1)  (12) 
IO-  9,258  0.6  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  -3.36  -3.43  1,519  2.5  7.108  5.2 
25-  16,968  I .5  -1.4  -1.2  0.2  -0.9  0.7  0.8  0.82  0.84  6,807  9.6  10,069  12.3 
50-  16,408  4. I  -4.3  -3.5  0.6  -2.8  2.0  2.1  0.74  0.75  7,829  8.9  8,576  17.3 
1 00-  3,389  0.8  -1.5  -1.3  0.1  -  1.2  0.5  0.4  0.39  0.40  2,076  5.2  1,312  5  .O 
200+  795  0.2  -0.4  -0.4  0  -0.36  0.2  0.2  0.48  0.50  398  3.4  369  1.8 
mean 1,593"  mean 1,467" 
Total  50.73  1  7.4  -7.9  -6.3  0.9  -5.2  -3.8  -3.9  0.73  0.74  18,706  29.8  28,571  41.9 
Source: Estimates are based on TAXSIM model calculations using the 1991 Treasury public-use sample aged to 1994 levels. 
Nofe:  Amounts are in billions of dollars. All figures for 1994. 
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It is interesting to compare the distribution of the static revenue loss and the 
distribution of the revenue loss with the behavioral change. In the lowest in- 
come class, the induced increase in earnings is enough to cause total taxes 
to rise. The middle-bracket  taxpayers still receive 50 percent  of  the overall 
tax reduction. 
Comparing column (9) with column (1) of table 2.2 shows that the largest 
relative reduction in couples paying a marriage penalty occurs among those in 
the $25,000-$50,000 AGI class. The decline in the number of mamage penalty 
couples in this group from 7.8 to 6.8 million is about two-thirds of the overall 
decline in those paying a marriage penalty. 
Table 2.5 shows the sensitivity of the revenue and deadweight loss estimates 
of the second-earner deduction to alternative assumptions about labor supply 
elasticities. Row 1 repeats the baseline estimates shown in row 2 of table 2.3. 
Row 2 shows the effect of reducing the behavioral elasticities (both compen- 
sated and uncompensated) by 50 percent. The change in earnings is of course 
reduced by 50 percent, from $7.4 to $3.7 billion. Since the static revenue esti- 
mate does not depend on behavior, it remains unchanged. The revenue loss 
with behavior is now larger. Cutting the behavioral elasticities in half reduces 
the difference between the static revenue changes and the behavioral revenue 
Table 2.5  Sensitivity Analysis of Secondary Earner Deduction 
Change in 
Behavior  Deadweight  Loss per 
Change  Static  Loss:  Dollar of 
in  Revenue  PIT+  Upper  Revenue 
Revenue Change with  Change in  Deadweight 
Earnings  Change  PIT  OASDHIG  OASDHIG  Bound  Loss 
Description  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1.  Baseline  7.4  -7.9  -6.3  1.1  -5.2  -3.8  0.72 
2.  Reduce 
elasticities by 
50 percent  3.1  -1.9  -7.1  0.6  -6.6  -2.8  0.42 
elasticities by 
50percent  11.0  -7.9  -5.5  1.7  -3.8  -4.8  1.26 
4.  No behavior 
among AGI 
<$50,000  5.2  -7.9  -6.1  0.8  -5.9  -2.7  0.46 
5. Reduce hours 
of new 
entrants by 
50 percent  5.9  -7.9  -6.7  0.9  -5.8  -2.9  0.50 
3.  Raise 
Source:  Estimates are based on TAXSIM model calculations using the 1991 Treasury public-use 
sample aged to 1994 levels. 
Nore: Amounts are in billions of  dollars. All figures for 1994. 67  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
changes with the baseline elasticities by 50 percent. But even with the elasticit- 
ies reduced by 50 percent, the total revenue loss of $6.6 billion is one-sixth 
smaller than the static revenue loss. The reduction in the deadweight loss de- 
clines from $3.8 billion with the baseline elasticities to $2.8 billion with the 
reduced elasticities. The reduction in deadweight loss per dollar of revenue 
loss is thus still 42 cents. 
The effect of  an  increase  in  the behavioral  elasticities  is  symmetrically 
higher. Earnings rise by $11 billion, and the revenue loss is limited to only $3.8 
billion. The change in the deadweight loss is $4.8 billion, implying a reduction 
in deadweight loss of $1.26 per dollar of revenue loss. 
Because the estimates of the behavioral elasticities that we use are based on 
Eissa’s analysis of the experience of relatively high income taxpayers, we con- 
sider another and more radical  sensitivity analysis: assuming no behavioral 
response among taxpayers with incomes below $50,000. The results are shown 
in row 4. Even with no behavioral response among taxpayers with AGI below 
$50,000, the secondary earner deduction causes earnings to rise by $5.2 bil- 
lion, or 70 percent of  the total for all taxpayers. The revenue loss with the 
baseline elasticities for those with AGIs over $50,000 and zero elasticities for 
those with AGIs below $50,000 is $6.7 billion, or $0.4 billion more than when 
everyone is assumed to behave in the same way. The total revenue loss with 
behavior is $5.9 billion, or $0.7 billion more than when all are assumed to act 
in the same way. Thus, even if  we ignore the behavior of  all taxpayers with 
AGIs less than $50,000, behavior reduces the estimated revenue loss by  25 
percent. The reduction in the deadweight loss is restricted to those with AGIs 
above $50,000 since all others are assumed not to respond to the initial taxes. 
The resulting deadweight loss decline is $2.7 billion, implying a deadweight 
loss reduction of 46 cents per dollar of revenue loss. 
The final analysis examines the sensitivity of the calculations to the assump- 
tion that individuals who are induced to enter the labor force by the secondary 
earner credit work the same number of hours as the existing employees. Row 
5 shows the effect of reducing the average hours of these new entrants by 50 
percent. The additional earnings induced by the more favorable tax rules are 
reduced by one-fifth, and the revenue loss with behavioral responses increases 
from $5.2 to $5.9 billion. The improvement in the deadweight loss declines 
from $3.8 to $2.7 billion. Thus, even with this reduction in hours for new parti- 
cipants, the second-earner credit reduces the deadweight loss by 46 cents per 
dollar of revenue loss. 
2.4.2  Special Secondary Earner Flat Rate Tax Schedules 
The secondary earner deduction is an example of  the differentially lower 
tax rate on secondary earners that optimal tax theory suggests. It achieves a 
significant reduction  in the deadweight loss with a relatively modest cost in 
foregone revenue. We now present an alternative way of giving a lower tax rate 68  Martin Feldstein and Daniel R. Feenberg 
to secondary earners by allowing the secondary earner to choose between her 
usual tax (up to the first $50,000 of her wage income) and an optional flat rate 
tax on that income. 
The first such option that we consider is an optional flat rate tax of  15 per- 
cent on the first $50,000 of the secondary earner’s wage income.  Unlike the 
10 percent deduction for secondary earners, this option is valuable only to a 
secondary earner who pays a marginal personal income tax rate in excess of 
15 percent on at least part of her income. This is true only if the couple has 
taxable income of at least $38,000; with two children, this corresponds to AGI 
of at least $54,150. For those who do qualify, the marginal tax rate is reduced 
from 28 percent (or higher) to 15 percent unless the woman’s earnings exceed 
$50,000. Such a marginal tax rate reduction brings a substantial reduction in 
deadweight 
The results are summarized in row 3 of table 2.3. The deadweight loss is 
reduced by  at least $11.5 billion  (col. [6]) and perhaps by as much as $12.9 
billion (col. [7]). The greater relative gap between the lower and upper bounds 
reflects the larger reduction in the marginal tax rate, making it more difficult 
to be precise about the reservation  wage for those who are not working now 
but who enter the labor force in response to the tax rate reduction. The substan- 
tial decline in the marginal tax rate also induces a $27.9 billion rise in earnings, 
enough to reduce the revenue loss from the static $27.1 billion (col. [2]) to a 
net loss of  only $18.8 billion (col.  [5]).  The optional  15 percent flat rate tax 
thus reduces the deadweight  loss by between 61 and 69 cents per dollar of 
revenue loss. 
The flat rate tax is more effective at reducing the marriage penalty, cutting 
the number of marriage penalty couples to 3 1 percent from the 36 percent with 
the secondary earner deduction and the 40 percent under current law. This of 
course reflects not only the targeting of this tax reduction but also the much 
larger cost of this tax change. 
The cost of an optional flat rate tax on part of the secondary earner’s wage 
income can be reduced while maintaining the same simple structure of the plan 
by  increasing the tax rate on the alternative flat rate tax. With an optional flat 
rate of 20 percent (instead of the 15 percent), a woman will choose the optional 
tax only if  her average effective tax rate on the first $50,000 of her income 
exceeds 20 percent.35  The results of this plan are shown in row 4 of table 2.3. 
The static revenue loss is cut nearly in half to $14.9 billion and, with the $14.7 
34. The woman might choose the optional tax even if it implied a higher tax burden at her initial 
level of earnings because it gives her the opportunity to increase her earnings at a lower marginal 
tax rate. Our analysis therefore understates both the efficiency gain and the revenue loss by assum- 
ing that taxpayers only take the optional rate when it  lowers their tax  liability on their original 
level of earnings. 
35. Once again, she might prefer the optimal tax because it allows her to earn a higher net wage 
even if she had to accept a smaller net-of-tax income on her initial earnings. The higher optional 
marginal tax rate would however still reduce the number of women who take the optional plan. 69  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
billion projected rise in earnings, the net decline in total revenue is only $9.8 
billion. The static revenue loss overstates this projected revenue loss by  more 
than 50 percent. 
The efficiency gain is smaller than with the  15 percent flat tax but still im- 
plies a reduced deadweight loss between $7.0 and $7.6 billion. Comparing this 
to the $9.8 billion net revenue loss indicates a reduction in the overall dead- 
weight loss of between 7 1 and 77 cents per dollar of lost revenue. 
2.4.3  Separate Filing by Husbands and Wives 
The most obvious alternative to the current tax treatment of two-earner fami- 
lies is a rule that requires each individual to file a separate tax return. Design- 
ing a system of separate filing involves decisions about the division between 
the husband  and wife of  nonlabor income and of  itemized deductions. One 
option is to base the division of income on the ownership of underlying assets 
and the division of deductions  on the  individual who incurs the deductible 
expense. The income from jointly owned property would be divided in half as 
would joint deductible expenses (e.g., mortgage interest on a jointly  owned 
house). Although advocates of  this method recognize that couples could use 
interspousal transfers to reduce tax liabilities, they argue that such transfers of 
assets are real transfers, not likely to be entered into lightly in an age in which 
the ratio of  divorces to marriages has reached 50 percent and more than a third 
of women in their forties who have been married have also been divorced. The 
alternative is to use arbitrary rules for dividing property  income and deduc- 
tions, either automatically assigning them to minimize tax burdens or merely 
dividing everything equally between the two spouses. 
We do not have the underlying data on intrafamily asset ownership and ex- 
pense patterns with which to allocate them between the  spouses. Moreover, 
even if we had current information on income and expenses, it would not be 
appropriate to use that information to measure how those assets and expenses 
would be divided under a system that required  separate filing based on the 
individual ownership of assets and individual deductions. We therefore adopt 
the rule that divides all nonlabor income, adjustments to gross income, deduct- 
ible expenses, personal exemptions, and tax credits equally between the hus- 
band and wife. 
A shift from the current joint filing requirement to mandatory separate filing 
also requires a decision about the tax rates to be used at each level of income. 
We present four alternative analyses. The first permits the primary earner to 
continue to use the current schedule for joint filers while the secondary earner 
uses a special new schedule equal to 60 percent of the current single filer’s rate 
at each level of taxable income. For many women, filing a separate tax return 
with half of the deductions and exemptions for the family means paying no tax 
at all. The marginal tax rate drops from  15 percent, 28 percent, or higher to 
zero. Although the lower marginal tax rate can induce a substantial reduction 
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that loss is associated with the decrease from the 15 percent tax bracket, it is a 
relatively inefficient  way  of  reducing deadweight loss. These characteristics 
are reflected in the estimates presented in row 5 of table 2.3. 
Column (2) shows that the static revenue loss would be $65.2 billion. Al- 
though the reduced marginal tax rates induce an earnings rise of $65.6 billion, 
the personal income tax loss is only reduced very slightly (to $59.0 billion, as 
shown in  col.  [3]) because  much  of  the  additional  earnings are earned by 
women who, after the reform, would not be subject to any tax at all because 
they would file separately with half of the deductions and exemptions of  the 
family. Even with additional payroll tax revenue of $9.5 billion, the net revenue 
loss is $49.5 billion. 
The reduction in the deadweight loss is at least $18.4 billion and could be 
as large as $27.3 billion. The much greater uncertainty about the magnitude of 
the reduced deadweight loss reflects the sharp drop in the marginal tax rate, 
often from 28 percent or higher to zero. The lower and upper bounds imply 
that this option would reduce the deadweight loss by between 37 and 55 cents 
per dollar of revenue, substantially less than the other proposals that did not 
involve the possibility of a zero tax rate. 
Option 6 is similar to option 5 but only reduces the tax rates on the single- 
earner schedule to 80 percent of their current values. Although this seems like 
a substantial reduction in the tax advantage to the secondary earner, that is not 
true for those who do not have taxable income. Similarly, the primary earner 
continues to get the advantage of paying tax on a much reduced taxable income 
at the joint-filer tax rates. The result is a continued large revenue loss and a 
relatively unfavorable ratio of efficiency gain per dollar of revenue loss. 
Row 6 of table 2.3 shows that the $55.6 billion  increase in earnings only 
induces a net increase in revenue of $6.3 billion, a clear indication that most 
of the increased earnings are to women in the zero marginal tax rate bracket. 
Even when the additional payroll tax revenue is recognized, the net revenue 
loss is still $40.1 billion. The change in deadweight loss is therefore only be- 
tween 38 and 60 cents per dollar of  revenue loss. 
The final two rules are designed to be revenue neutral when the behavioral 
response of the married women is taken into account. The first of these requires 
mandatory separate filing by husbands and wives using the tax brackets of the 
joint return but with all tax rates multiplied by  1.11. The results are shown in 
row 7 of table 2.3. The women’s earnings rise by $45.5 billion, cutting the loss 
in personal income tax revenue from the $12.5 billion static estimate to $6.9 
billion. This is completely offset by  the additional $6.9 billion of payroll tax 
revenue. Despite the revenue neutrality, the deadweight loss is reduced by be- 
tween $13.2 and $19.3 billion. Since many women would still find themselves 
paying no tax, the revenue neutrality is achieved by increasing the tax rates on 
their husbands  who face the  rescaled  single-earner  schedule  instead of  the 
more favorable joint-filer schedule. The remaining small static revenue loss in 
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of  the higher earnings of the mamed women. This analysis does of course 
reflect the strong (but traditional) assumption that the labor supply of husbands 
is completely inelastic.36 
The final revenue-neutral income splitting option that we present (row 8 of 
table 2.3) uses the tax rate brackets of the single-taxpayer schedule but reduces 
all rates to 92.9 percent of existing statutory rates. The results are quite similar 
to those of row 7 based on the joint-taxpayer schedule. 
2.4.4  Eliminating the Secondary Earner Social Security Tax Burden 
The current method of calculating social security benefits has the effect of 
giving married women very little additional benefit in return for the extra pay- 
roll taxes that they pay when they work more. As we noted earlier in the paper, 
this has the effect of making the married woman’s marginal tax rate substan- 
tially higher than her husband’s. In this section we consider the effect of elimi- 
nating the actuarially unfair burden of  social security on married women by 
excluding married women from the OASDHI tax base.37 
The final row of table 2.3  shows that the resulting reduction in marginal 
tax rates would cause earnings to rise by  $37.9 billion and would reduce the 
deadweight loss of  the tax system by  at least $17.1 billion. Eliminating the 
social security tax on married women does however reduce payroll tax revenue 
by $5 1.4 billion. The offsetting revenue gain of $8.5 billion of additional per- 
sonal income tax revenue leaves a net revenue loss of $42.9 billion, implying 
that the deadweight burden reduction is between 39 and 46 cents per dollar of 
revenue loss, similar to the efficiency of  the separate filing options and less 
cost-effective than the secondary earner deduction. 
2.5  Concluding Comments 
Three general conclusions emerge from analyzing the simulations of the 
various options presented in this paper. First, the existing high marginal tax 
rates on married women cause substantial deadweight losses that can be re- 
duced by alternative tax rules that lower their marginal tax rates. Second, the 
behavioral responses to the lower marginal tax rates induce additional tax pay- 
ments that offset large fractions of the “static” revenue losses. Third, there are 
substantial differences in cost-effectiveness among these options, that is, in the 
36. We recognize that the assumption that husbands do not respond to their higher marginal tax 
rates is unrealistic. A realistic analysis would recognize that husbands as well as wives respond to 
changes in marginal tax rates by altering the character of  their work and the pattern of their con- 
sumption. We will provide a more realistic analysis in a future paper that takes such broader behav- 
ior into account. 
37. This could be achieved in practice by  a rebatable credit equal to the full social security tax 
liability. Married women would continue to receive benefits on the basis of their husbands’ income 
as most of  them now do. We  do not consider the effect of  the tax paid by  the married woman in 
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revenue cost per dollar of reduced deadweight loss. Several of the options are 
sufficiently cost-effective that they could probably  be combined with other 
ways of raising revenue to produce a net reduction in the deadweight loss of 
the tax system as a whole. 
We are aware however that the current framework is very restrictive in three 
important ways. First, it ignores  the response of  the primary  earner in the 
couple to any change in tax rates or spousal income. Second, it defines the 
labor supply response very narrowly in terms of participation and hours, ex- 
cluding such important dimensions of labor supply as choice of occupation 
and of  particular job, effort, location, travel requirements, risk bearing, as- 
sumption of responsibility, and so forth. More generally, taxes affect not only 
the labor supply of  men and women but also change taxable income through 
changes in excluded income (fringe benefits, etc.) and in taxpayer deductions. 
These changes in taxable income are the key variable for influencing tax reve- 
nue. Moreover, the deadweight loss of the tax system depends not just on the 
change in the amount of labor that individuals choose to supply but also on the 
induced changes in the amounts of excludible income and deductible expenses 
(Feldstein 199.5~).  We plan to extend the current work to merge the evidence 
on the effects of taxes on the hours and participation of married women with 
the more general evidence on the sensitivity of  taxable income to marginal 
tax rates. 
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Comment  Harvey S. Rosen 
The taxation of the family is an important topic that raises a variety of fascinat- 
ing technical,  political,  and social issues. The Feldstein-Feenberg  paper ad- 
vances our understanding of several of the key economic questions relating to 
the tax treatment of the family. Specifically, they examine how alternative poli- 
cies would affect labor supply, tax revenues, and excess burden. The basic tack 
is to take elasticity estimates of female labor supply from the literature and use 
them to infer behavioral changes associated with the various tax regimes. With 
the behavioral changes in hand, Feldstein and Feenberg can compute tax reve- 
nue changes and changes in consumer surplus. 
Feldstein and Feenberg use the conventional consumer surplus framework 
in a careful and creative way. I would like to discuss four technical issues that 
might be relevant in thinking about their procedure. 
Welfare economics with discrete choices.  As Feldstein and Feenberg stress, 
changes in the taxation of married women affect not only the supply of hours 
conditional  on working  but  also the labor force participation  decision.  The 
conventional consumer surplus framework does not allow for the analysis of 
discrete choices.  It turns out, however, that the conventional framework can 
easily be generalized to accommodate the fact that the probability that an indi- 
vidual works may depend on the tax system (see Small and Rosen 1981). One 
needs to compute the expected change in labor supply under a given tax re- 
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gime, which requires  estimates of  the probability that the individual works 
under that regime and the number of hours conditional on working. 
Instead of following this approach, Feldstein and Feenberg in effect try to 
bracket the “true” answer by assuming different values of the reservation wage. 
Further, they assume that if the current nonparticipants worked under a particu- 
lar tax regime, they would all work the same number of  hours. Feldstein and 
Feenberg go to a considerable amount of effort to motivate their procedure and 
argue that it is robust with respect to reasonable changes in assumptions. It 
would be interesting to see how their results would change if they based their 
analysis on expected values. To do so, they would need equations for the proba- 
bility of working and the number of hours worked conditional on being in the 
labor force. 
Elasticities.  The key behavioral parameters are based on Eissa’s (1995) study 
of married women’s labor supply responses to the Tax Reform Act of  1986. It is 
important to note that Eissa’s analysis focused on the behavior of high-income 
women. While Feldstein and Feenberg provide us with some sensitivity analy- 
sis, it would be useful  to see the work done with elasticities calculated for 
women lower in the income scale. 
Before-tax wages.  Married women have been an important part of the labor 
force for a number of years now, and one would expect that substantial changes 
in their labor supply could induce changes in before-tax wage rates. It would 
be useful to incorporate such changes into the analysis. 
Perception of net social security tax rates.  An innovative and important part 
of the analysis is the inclusion of  net social security tax rates. Feldstein and 
Feenberg take into account not only social security taxes but the present actu- 
arial value of the benefits associated with these taxes. These net benefit rates 
play an important part in the analysis, and it would be nice if there were some 
research indicating whether they are perceived correctly by workers. 
I would like to turn now to some political and social questions raised by the 
paper. The normative framework behind the paper is optimal tax theory. Any 
change in the tax system that reduces excess burden, ceteris paribus, is “good.” 
Hence, the paper is subject to the usual criticisms of  this framework. For ex- 
ample, from a political point of view, a prescription based on the goal of a 
“level playing  field”  might make  more  sense than  one which differentiates 
among spouses. Once politicians are given scope to make distinctions, they 
may make distinctions that lead to worse situations than the status quo. In the 
current context, certain proposals now circulating to make the tax system more 
“profamily” might end up making the system even more inefficient  than  it 
is now, 
Like the optimal tax literature, the paper also ignores nonutilitarian consid- 
erations that might be important. Ultimately, one has to deal with the question 75  The Taxation of Two-Earner Families 
of what the correct unit of taxation is, the family or the individual. One’s views 
about the role of the family in society will have a heavy weight in determining 
one’s views about the appropriate tax treatment of the family. Having said all 
of  this, computations of  excess burden  are an important  component of  any 
analysis of the taxation of the family, and this paper provides the best estimates 
to date. 
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